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CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S MOVEMENT TOWARD A




In June 1990, the people of Czechoslovakia, after experiencing over
forty years of Communist dictatorship,I elected a democratic government. 2
The new government was charged with the task of formulating a new
Constitution within two years. 3 This goal proved to be unattainable. As
a result, in June 1992, following a subsequent round of elections, the
division of Czechoslovakia into two separate countries appeared
inevitable.4 This note will focus on Czechoslovakia's struggle to meet the
challenge of creating a constitutional system capable of preserving its
national structure and providing sufficient autonomy to the Slovak
population.
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia is in no small part due to the fact
that the considerable cultural and economic differences between Czechs
and Slovaks that have existed during the period immediately following
the First World War,5 when the country formulated its last democratic
constitution, 6 have not diminished.7  This outcome is nonetheless
regrettable for there were significant factors that distinguished the present
political reality from the past, such as the 1969 transformation of the
Czechoslovak constitutional system from a unitary to a federal
government.' Also, Vaclav Havel, the president of Czechoslovakia until
1. The Velvet Hangover, HARPER'S, Oct. 1990, at 18 (Speech given in July 1990 by Vaclav
Havel at the opening of the Salzburg Festival in Australia).
2. Id.; see also Robin Knight et al., Prague's Day-Glo Revival, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, June 11, 1990, at 45.
3. LIDOVA DEMOKRACii, Aug. 18, 1990, translated and reprinted in Pithart on Tripartite
Government Meeting, FBIS-EEU-90-164, Aug. 23, 1990, at 11.
4. Czechs and Slovaks Say They Plan Split, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1992, §1, at 3
[hereinafter Split].
5. Joseph S. Roucek, Czechoslovakia's Minorities, in CZECHOSLOVAKIA 184 (Robert J.
Kerner ed. 1949).
6. DOROTHEAEL MALLAKH, THE SLOVAK AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, 1935-1939: A STUDY IN
UNRELENTING NATIONALISM 35 (1979).
7. Knight, supra note 2, at 45; William E. Schmidt, Czechs Right, Slovaks Left, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 1992, at A7.
8. CAROL. S. LEFF, NATIONAL CoNFLIcr IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE MAKING AND REMAKING
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
July 1992, understood the need of the Slovak people to preserve their
separate identity. 9 While the strictly centralist constitution of 192010
embittered the Slovaks"1 and divided the nation, 2 the new constitution
promised to provide greater political self-expression to the Slovak people.
This was illustrated by the power-sharing bill that was passed by the
Federal Assembly in December 1990. It gave more authority to the
Slovak republic after its premier threatened to leave the federation.13
However, ultimately, the modern Czechoslovak republic, like interwar
Czechoslovakia, was a victim of the dominant trends of its time. The
Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 was a product of the nineteenth century
idea of a strong, centralist, uninational state.14 Similarly, the failure of the
democratic government of Czechoslovakia to develop a constitution must
be viewed within the larger European context. At the present time, a
parochial nationalism is undermining the concept of a united federal
western Europe, as well as causing turmoil and bloodshed in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.15 This scenario discouraged the
development of a Czechoslovak constitution that established a federal,
multinational state and at the same time preserved the larger structure of
the nation.
IU. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Czechs and Slovaks are the descendants of Slavic tribes16 that
were united under the rule of the Moravian Empire in the ninth century
A.D. 17 At that time there were no significant national distinctions between
OF A STATE, 1918-1987, at 121 (1988); EUGEN STEINER, THE SLOVAK DILEMMA 197 (1973).
9. Vaclav Havel's New Year's Address, 34 ORBIs: J. WORLD AFF. 253, 259 (1990).
10. EL MALIAMH, supra note 6, at 35.
11. LEFF, supra note 8, at 63; JOSEPH KORBEL, TWENTIETH CENTURY CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE
MEANINGS OF ITS HISTORY 101 (1977).
12. JozEF LErrRIcH, HISTORY OF MODERN SLOVAKIA 58 (1955); LEFF, supra note 8, at 63.
13. John Tagliabue, Conflicts Defused in Czechoslovakia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990,
at All.
14. See HANUS J. HAJEK, T.G. MASARYK REVISrrED: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 158-59
(1983); E. GARRISON WALTERS, THE OTHER EUROPE: EASTERN EUROPE TO 1945, at 151 (1988).
15. Conor C. O'Brien, Pursuing a Chimera-Nationalism at Odds with the Idea of a
Federal Europe, THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London), Mar. 13, 1992, at 3-4; Jacques
Attali, Europe's Descent into Tribalism, NEW PERSP. Q., Fall 1992, at 38.
16. See s. HARRISON THOMSON, CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 7-9 (1965); see also
ALEXANDER KUNOSI, THE BASIS OF CZECHOSLOVAK UNITY 13 (194).
17. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 10-11; KUNOSI, supra note 16, at 13.
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Czechs and Slovaks. 8 Then, in the early part of the eleventh century, the
Magyar tribes invaded the southeastern part of the empire.19 The people
in the eastern and western areas of the former Moravian Empire were to
remain separated for almost one-thousand years.2"
As a result of this separation, the peoples in the two regions
developed cultures that were markedly different." The western, or Czech,
area was heavily influenced by German and Western culture.22 The
Czechs became cosmopolitan23 and their land was eventually thoroughly
industrialized.' During the early fifteenth century, the Czechs became
staunch adherents of the ideas of John Hus, the Czech religious
reformer 26 who was burned at the stake by the Catholic Church.27 While
the Hapsburgs technically re-Catholicized the Czechs 28 after subjugating
them in the early seventeenth century, 29 the Czechs were Catholic only
in a nominal sense.3" They identified Catholicism with the Hapsburgs,
who had taken their independence from them.3' The figure of Hus
remained very much alive in the national consciousness of the Czech
people. 2 During the nineteenth century, the Czechs' movement towards
18. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 11.
19. Id. at 11-12.
20. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 12-13; KUNOSI, supra note 16, at 15; Roucek, supra note
5, at 184-85.
21. See Roucek, supra note 5, at 184-85.
22. See WALTERS, supra note 14, at 124; see THOMSON, supra note 16, at 14-15; see Roucek,
supra note 5, at 185.
23. See Roucek, supra note 5, at 185.
24. Id.; WALTERS, supra note 14, at 36; LEFF, supra note 8, at 12; ZBYNEK ZEMAN, THE
MASARYKS: THE MAKING OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 128 (1976).
25. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 84-86; WALTERS, supra note 14, at 30; EL MALLAKH, supra
note 6, at 14.
26. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 77-80; WALTERS, supra note 14, at 30; EL MALLAKH, supra
note 6, at 14.
27. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 84.
28. CECIL J. C. STREET, PRESIDENT MASARYK 50-52 (1930).
29. See THOMSON, supra note 16, at 111-13; EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 14; WALTERS,
supra note 14, at 30.
30. Roucek, supra note 5, at 185.
31. See id.; see also EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 14.
32. See TOMAS G. MASARYK, THE MEANING OF CZECH HISTORY 10 (1974);
RuDoLF SCHLESINGER, FEDERALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 299 (1945); JOHN F. N.
BRADLEY, CZECH NATIONALISM IN TiE NINETEENTH CENTURY 92 (1984); LEFF, supra note 8, at 20;
EL MALI.AKH, supra note 6, at 14.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
nationalism was gaining strength.33 Czech patriots, including Thomas
Masaryk, later to become the first president of Czechoslovakia,34 looked
towards Hus and his beliefs as a model for a democratic national
tradition.35
The people in the eastern area, which became known as Slovakia,36
developed contrasting attitudes. 37  The Slovaks were influenced by the
more eastern Magyar culture.38 They were much more conservative than
the Czechs, 39 and their society remained agrarian.' In addition, they were
strictly Roman Catholic.41 These differences not only gave the Slovaks a
sense of a separate identity,42 but led to dissension within the new state
after the First World War at a time when this identity was ignored by the
leadership in Prague.43
During the First World War, when Czechs and Slovaks were together
fighting the Austro-Hungarian Empire," it appeared as if both peoples
could live in one country under a federal government.45 In October 1915,
Czech and Slovak organizations signed an agreement in Cleveland, Ohio.46
This document called for the independence of the Czech lands and
Slovakia.47 It also demanded "the unity of the Czech and Slovak nation
in a federal state with total national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own
parliament, state administration, complete cultural freedom, the full use of
the Slovak language.""
33. See THOMSON, supra note 16, at 193-94, 196; see generally BRADLEY, supra note 32.
34. See HAJEK, supra note 14, at 19.
35. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 109-10; see MASARYK, supra note 32, at 21.
36. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 12.
37. See Roueek, supra note 5, at 15.
38. See KUNOSI, supra note 16, at 13; THOMSON, supra note 16, at 12; see Roucek, supra
note 5, at 185.
39. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 31.
40. See KuNosi, supra note 16, at 29; see WALTERS, supra note 14, at 202.
41. See Roucek, supra note 5, at 185; see STEINER, supra note 8, at 24; see LEFF, supra note
8, at 22-23; see THOMSON, supra note 16, at 334-35; see STREET, supra note 28, at 67;
YESHAYAHU JEL1NEK, THE LusT FOR PowER: NATIONALISM, SLOVAKLA, AND THE COMMUNISrs 1918-
1948, at 5 (1983).
42. See STEINER, supra note 8, at 7.
43. See LEFF, supra note 8, at 63; see JELINEK, supra note 41, at 5.
44. See KuNOsi, supra note 16, at 19-21.
45. See EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 32; see THOMSON, supra note 16, at 290.
46. STEINER, supra note 8, at 18-19.
47. Id. at 18; see EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 32.
48. STEINER, supra note 8, at 18-19; see EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 32. Large numbers
[Vol. 13
19921 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 'S NEW CONSTITUTION
Another similar agreement was drafted in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in
191841 and signed by Thomas Masaryk.5° This agreement provided that
Slovakia would have its own administrative system, its own diet, and its
own courts.5" At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, the future
leaders of Czechoslovakia spoke of creating a multinational country
comparable to Switzerland.52
Contrary to these promises, after the Czechoslovak Republic was
established, the government in Prague was not eager to introduce the
promised autonomy.53  Rather, a policy of centralization was
implemented.'M Official speeches spoke of a single "Czechoslovak
nation."" The Constituent Assembly,56 a body that had not been elected
of Slovaks had emigrated to the United States. This agreement and the 1918 agreement were
signed in the United States in order to maintain continued Slovak support of the Czechoslovak
cause. The Czech leaders believed that the efforts of the Slovak-Americans were needed in
order to gain American recognition of that cause. LETrRICH, supra note 12, at 52-53.
49. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 314; STEINER, supra note 8, at 18; ELMALLAKH, supra note
6, at 32. The Pittsburgh Agreement provides:
The representatives of the Slovak and Czech organizations in the United
States, the Slovak League, the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of
Czech Catholics deliberating in the presence of the Chairman of the Czechoslovak
National Council, Professor Masaryk, on the Czechoslovak question and on our
previous declaration of program, have passed the following resolution:
We approve of the political program which aims at the union of
the Czechs and Slovaks in an independentState composed ofthe Czech
Lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have her own administrative
system, her own diet and her own courts. The Slovak language shall
be the official language in the schools, in the public offices and in
public affairs generally. The Czechoslovak State shall be a republic,
and its constitution a democratic one. The organization of the
collaboration between Czechs and Slovaks in the United States shall,
according to need and the changing situation, be intensified and
regulated by mutual. Detailed provisions relating to the organization
of the Czechoslovak State shall be left to the liberated Czechs and
Slovaks and their duly accredited representatives.
EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 32.
50. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 32.
51. Id.; THOMSON, supra note 16, at 314; STEINER, supra note 8, at 18.
52. LEFF, supra note 8, at 137-38; HAIEX, supra note 14, at 25; EL MALLAKH, supra note 6,
at 35.
53. HUGH SETON-WATSON, EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS: 1918-1941, at 175 (1946).
54. Id. at 175-76.
55. Id. at 176.
56. THE CONSTITUTIONALCHARTER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, reprinted in SELECT
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
by the people, was formed in November 1918, three days after the end of
the First World War,57 promulgated the Constitution of 1920, which
reflected this political turnabout. Article 3(1) of the Constitution states
that "the territories of the Czechoslovak Republic shall form a united and
indivisible unit. "58
The centralist orientation of this document is also demonstrated by the
way in which it allocated legislative power. Article 6(1) provided that
such power shall be exercised by the National Assembly "over the whole
territory of the Czechoslovak Republic." 59  It also clearly designated
Prague, the capital of the Czech lands, as the location for the National
Assembly.' In addition, article 7(2) mandated that laws passed by the
National Assembly "shall be binding throughout the Czechoslovak
Republic. "61 As far as judicial power is concerned, article 95(2)
authorized the establishment of a supreme court that would have
jurisdiction over "the entire territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. "62
Thus, the Constitution of 1920 directly contravened the provisions of the
Pittsburgh Agreement63 in that Slovakia was given neither a separate
legislature, a separate court, nor any autonomy whatsoever. 64
Furthermore, the constitution did not acknowledge the Slovaks as a people
with their own identity.65 Indeed, it only referred to the "Czechoslovak
people. "'
The unitary character of the new state as enshrined in the Constitution
was largely a result of Czech attitudes pertaining to the new nation itself
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 140 (1922) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER].
57. Id.
58. Id. at 145.
59. Id. at 146. Article 6 states:
1. Legislative power over the whole territory of the Czechoslovak Republic shall
be exercised by the National Assembly, which shall be composed of two Chambers:
a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate.
2. The seat of both Chambers shall be at Prague. In case of absolute necessity,





62. Id. at 162.
63. See EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 35.
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and to the Slovaks.67 The leadership of the new state was mostly Czech."8
It developed the concept of "Czechoslovakism," 69 which was intended to
instill a sense of unity between the two peoples that had been politically
and culturally separated for nearly one-thousand years.70 The Czech
leaders did not conceive of Czechs and Slovaks as separate entities.71
Doctor Boucek, the official in charge of the formal presentation of the
constitution before the Constituent Assembly, contended that centralization
was the desire of the entire Czechoslovak nation. 72 However, the Czech
conception of Czechoslovak unity was very paternalistic towards the
Slovaks. 73 The Czechs viewed the movement towards unity as a process
by which the western and more modern Czech branch of the nation would
"rescue" the eastern, backward Slovaks.74
President Masaryk's beliefs concerning the Slovaks also greatly
influenced Czechoslovakia's constitutional structure. It was his moral and
political vision that had played a major part in liberating the country.
Masaryk's mother raised him in her Czech tradition; he viewed himself as
a Czech, 76 although his father was Slovak.' Therefore, he believed that,
rather than two separate nations, the Czechs and Slovaks were brothers.78
He was convinced that if a separate Slovak identity existed it would
disappear 79 and visualized the Czechs and Slovaks becoming one people.
80
It was due to these convictions that, once Czechoslovakia became an
independent nation, he did not seriously consider creating a federal system
under which the Slovaks would be granted a certain amount of
67. See Leff, supra note 8, at 37-3
68. See id.
69. Id. at 133.
70. Id. at 134.
71. Id. at 181-82.
72. Id. at 134.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 61.
76. See HAJEK, supra note 14, at 1
77. THOMSON, supra note 16, at 23
78. See LEFF, supra note 8, at 138.
79. See OWEN JOHNSON, SLOVAKIA 19
(1985).
80. ZEMAN, supra note 24, at 128.
8.
'3; ZEMAN, supra note 24, at 16.
'18-1938: EDUCATION AND THE MAKNG OF A NATION 327
10519921
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
autonomy. 8t In fact, he later indicated that he only signed the Pittsburgh
agreement in order to retain the support of the Slovaks in America. 82
The failure of Masaryk and other Czech leaders to acknowledge the
legitimacy of the Slovak desire for autonomy only served to exacerbate the
differences between the two peoples. 83  The Pittsburgh Agreement
demonstrates two things. On the one hand, during the First World War,
the Slovaks enthusiastically supported a union with the Czechs." Even
before the war, Father Andrej Hlinka, who later became the leading figure
in the Slovak autonomy movement, 5 expressed his belief that it was
necessary to effect a union of Czechs and Slovaks. 86 On the other hand,
the Slovaks generally, and Hlinka specifically, wanted to participate in the
Czechoslovak state as a nation distinct from and equal to the Czechs. 7
Thus, both during and immediately after the First World War, the Slovaks
merely wished for the Czech recognition of a separate Slovak national
identity. 8 A constitutional guarantee to the effect that Slovakia would gain
autonomy after a specified period of time might have represented sufficient
recognition of Slovak nationhood. 9 Yet no such promise was included in
the constitution." This lack of acknowledgment began the process of
alienation among the Slovaks.9 1
Within this context of disappointed hopes, the disparities between
Czech and Slovak culture only increased the antagonism that Slovaks felt
towards the young republic.92 The staunchly Catholic Slovaks, already
disconcerted by the Czech tradition of espousing anti-clericalism, 93 were
greatly angered when the Prague government instituted a policy of seizing
secondary schools from the Catholic Church and placing them under state
%1. See EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 33.
82. See id. Masaryk admitted that the Pittsburgh Agreement was merely reached so as to
appease that faction of Slovaks which desired independence for Slovakia. Id.
83. See KORBEL, supra note 11, at 101.
84. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 37.
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id. at 36.
87. Id.
88. JOHNSON, supra note 79, at 332.
89. KoRBEL, supra note 11, at 101.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 46.
93. LEFF, supra note 8, at 22-23; JELINEK, supra note 41, at 5.
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control.' They also were disturbed by the Czech preference for placing
members of the minority Slovak Protestant community in positions of
importance. 9
The social and economic differences between Czechs and Slovaks also
contributed towards the growth of bitterness among the Slovaks.9 6 Since
Czech society was highly industrialized, the Prague government was
preoccupied with industrial problems such as the rights of trade unions,
workers' hours, and social security.97 At this time, the plight of Slovak
farmers needed much attention.9 They suffered because of loss of access
to foreign markets during the war99 and continued to struggle afterwards
due to the increase in value of Czechoslovak currency, which caused the
prices of agricultural commodities such as wheat to fall drastically. 00 Yet
their troubles, compounded in the 1930s by the Depression, ' ' were for the
most part overlooked by the central government.10 2 As a result, Slovak
resentment towards the Prague government multiplied.10 3 The Slovak
electorate became radicalized, supporting either Father Hlinka's rightist
Slovak People's Party or the Communists." In the 1920s, the number of
Slovaks voting for Hlinka's party had more than doubled. 5
Czech paternalism also infuriated the Slovaks."0 Most teachers and
officials in Slovakia were Czech. 10 7 Their condescending approach to
giving aid to the Slovaks in overcoming their "backwardness" only
worsened relations between the two peoples. 08 At the same time the
constitution was introduced, the Language Law was passed. 10 9  It
94. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 42; see also JOHNSON, supra note 79, at 319.
95. JELINEK, supra note 41, at 5.




100. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 43.
101. Id.
102. WALTERS, supra note 14, at 202.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. JELIFX, supra note 41, at 9.
106. HuGH SroN-WATsON, Tim "SicK HEART" Ov MOmERN EuROPE: THE PROBLEM OF THm
DANUBIAN LANDS 34 (1975).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. LETTRICH, supra note 12, at 57.
19921
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proclaimed that the official language of the new country was to be
"Czechoslovak.""' The condescending attitude of the Czechs, in
combination with the Language Law, convinced the Slovaks that the Czech
officials in Prague and in Slovakia intended to transform the Slovaks into
Czechs."' This only further embittered the Slovaks"' and caused them to
view themselves more as Slovak nationals than as citizens of
Czechoslovakia.'
These social influences caused Czechoslovakia to become extremely
polarized in the mid-1930s." 4  The Slovak nationalists, particularly
Hlinka's party, became more strident in their demands. 5 By 1938 most
of the electorate in Slovakia were opposed to the central government in
Prague." 6 This opposition constituted a basic weakness in the structure
of the country, which Hitler was able to exploit as he worked to destroy
Czechoslovakia's sovereignty." 7  Thus, the original failure of the
Constitution of 1920 to grant the Slovaks the autonomy that they had been
repeatedly promised created a political system and a pattern of relations
that undermined the existence of Czechoslovakia as an independent
country. 1 I
IlI. MODERN TIMES
In 1990, the newly emerging democracy of Czechoslovakia bore some
resemblance to the interwar Czechoslovakia in that it too was compelled
to contend with Slovak nationalism." 9 The significant differences between
Czechs and Slovaks had not disappeared.' For instance, Slovaks
remained fervently Catholic' and continued to resist sudden change such
110. Id. at 57-58.
111. SETON-WATSON, supra note 106, at 34.
112. Id.
113. KORBEL, supra note 11, at 101.
114. LEFF, supra note 8, at 63.
115. Id.
116. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 87.
117. Id.
118. WALTERS, supra note 14, at 201.
119. Valerie Bunce, The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe, WORLD POL'Y
J., Summer 1990, at 427.




as radical economic reform." In addition, some Slovaks were calling for
outright secession. " Nevertheless, important reforms that were
introduced in 1968-69 markedly altered the country's constitutional
system'2' in a way that nearly aided in preserving a unified, democratic
Czechoslovakia.
A. Federalization
In 1968 a constitutional law was introduced at the initiative of
Dubeck, 125 a Slovak,1 16 that rendered basic alterations in the political
structure of the country. 12 1 It transformed Czechoslovakia from a
centralist, unitary system into a federation composed of two republics, one
Czech and one Slovak.1 28 While the Soviet invasion in 1968 delayed the
practical application of the new law, 121 it was implemented in 1969130 by
Husak, also a Slovak."' The Action Program, the official document
addressing this reform, echoes the Slovak aspirations for autonomy 132 that
were summarily dismissed during the interwar period.133 It first refers to
Czechoslovakia as a "joint state of two equal nations," 34 and then explains
that the relationship between the two nations must be constitutionally
structured so as "to strengthen the unity of the state." 35 More
importantly, it admits that there were vital flaws in the centralist
constitutional system since 1920.136
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 4.
125. Id. at 1.
126. See STEINER, supra note 8, at 182.
127. id. at 197.
128. Id.
129. EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 4.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 5-6.
132. Id. at 1-2.
133. See id. at 1.
134. Id. at 2.
135. ld.
136. Id. The document states that "it cannot be denied that ... there are serious faults and
fundamental deformation in the constitutional arrangement of relations between the Czechs and
Slovaks." Id.
19921
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Constitutional Act Number 143' reflects these beliefs. 138  It
represents a radical departure from the Constitution of 1920 and the
Communist Constitutions of 1948 and 1960.139 While the Constitution of
1948, unlike that of 1920, acknowledged that the country is composed of
two Slav nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks 140 it clearly and
unequivocally established that "[tihe Czechoslovak Republic is a unitary
state." 14' The Constitution of 1960 also contains this statement. 142
In contrast to this language, article 1(1) of Constitutional Act Number
143 provides that Czechoslovakia is a "federative state. "143 Article 1(2)
of the Act states that Czechoslovakia is composed of the "equal, national
states of the Czech and the Slovak nations."" Furthermore, it recognizes
that each nation possesses the right of self-determination. t45  Section 3
refers to the Czechs and the Slovaks as "two independent, sovereign
nations" 146 and section 4 formally asserts that Czechoslovakia consists of
two republics, the Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist
Republic.' 47 More significantly, section 5 requires the central government
to "respect the sovereignty of the two national states."1 48 These provisions
exemplify the clear divergence of the Act from the direction the
Constitution of 1920 set for the nation. 1
49
137. Constitutional Act Number 143, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONSOF THE COUNTRIES OFTHE
WORLD, at 33 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1974) [hereinafter Constitutional
Act].
138. See EL MALLAKH, supra note 6, at 4.
139. See STEINER, supra note 8, at 197-201.
140. Constitution of the CzechoslovakRepublic, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS,
at 603 (Amos 1. Peaslee ed. 1950).
141. Id.
142. Constitution of Czechoslovakia, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, at 227 (Amos
J. Peaslee 3rd ed. 1968).
143. Constitutional Act, supra note 137, at 36.
144. Id. Article 1(2) provides: "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is founded on the
voluntary bond of the equal, national states of the Czech and Slovak nations, based on the right
of each of these nations to self-determination." Id.
145. id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Article 1(4) provides: "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Slovak
Socialist Republic. Both Republics shall have equal position within the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic." Id.
148. Id.
149. STEINER, supra note 8, at 197.
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The new federal system offered a formula that enabled Czechs and
Slovaks to carry on their individual, national lives within one state.15 0
This was the very form of government for which Slovak nationalists
strived after the First World War and that foreign political experts
believed to be extremely workable."' The Slovaks believed through 1968
that federalization would supply a governmental structure that would
endow them with political security and national recognition.5 2 Thus, the
Slovaks welcomed the new federation' because it removed the obstacles
that the Constitution of 1920 placed in the way of their gaining control
over internal politics.' 5 On the other hand, the Czech population
understood that, due to the destructive divisiveness caused by the centralist
system in the past, federalization was a matter of practical necessity."'
B. Post-Communist, Democratic Czechoslovakia
Despite laws introduced in 1970 to weaken the federation in order to
preserve the Communist party's control over the entire country," 6
Czechoslovakia maintained its federalized system, in form, if not in
substance."5 7 Consequently, in June 1990, democratic Czechoslovakia had
three freely elected governments: federal, Czech, and Slovak.' s In an
early draft of the constitution presented by the Civic Forum, 5 9 the
movement that led the democratic movement in 1989,160 the influence of
150. Id. at 201.
151. LEFF, supra note 8, at 85.
152. Id.
153. STERNER, supra note 8, at 201.
154. LEFF, supra note 8, at 122.
155. Id. at 125.
156. Bratislava Domestic Service, Aug. 19, 1990, translated and reprinted in Slovak
Leaders Discuss Tripartite Meeting, FBIS-EEU-90-162, Aug. 21, 1990, at 10 [hereinafter
Slovak Leaders].
157. ELm ABEL, THE SHArrERED BLOC: BEHIND THE UPHEAVAL IN EASTERN EUROPE 71
(1990).
158. Timothy G. Ash, Eastern Europe: Apres le Deluge, Nous, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug.
16, 1990, at 55.
159. CzechoslovakDraft Constitution, reprinted in PRAVDA, Dec. 8, 1989, at 4, translated
and reprinted in Draft Constitution presented by Civic Forum, FBIS-EEU-89-243, Dec. 20,
1989, at 27-29 [hereinafter Draft Constitution].
160. Jiri Pehe, Czechoslovakia's Changing Political Spectrum, RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT,
Jan. 31, 1992, at 1.
19921
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 13
the constitutional law which federalized the country is evident. 61 Principle
Number 2 of the draft constitution expresses the tenet that the
Czechoslovak Republic itself is based upon the concept of "the
sovereignty, equality, and statehood of the Czech and Slovak nations. "162
It also acknowledges the right of the two nations to self-determination.
1 63
In addition, it authorizes the adoption of constitutions by the individual
sovereign republics that will "independently and sui juris determine their
internal relations."" This draft constitution, unlike Czechoslovakia's last
democratic Constitution of 1920, fulfills the spirit of the Pittsburgh
agreement. It unequivocally acknowledges Slovak autonomy.
The president and the premier of the first modem, democratic
government of Czechoslovakia, as opposed to Masaryk and the other
interwar Czech leaders, recognized the need to construct a framework of
government that would provide the Slovaks with sufficient control over
their internal political affairs. 16' The Slovak premier 166 of Czechoslovakia,
Marian Calfa,167 emphasized his commitment to transferring influence back
to the republics and building the democratic federation out of the will of
the people. 161 President Havel, a Czech,'169 also dedicated himself to
working towards the creation of an authentic federation. 70 He indicated
161. See generally Draft Constitution, supra note 159.
162. Id. at 28. Principle Number 2 provides:
The foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic is the principle of sovereignty,
equality, and statehood of the Czech and Slovak nations. The Czech and Slovak
nations are guaranteed the right to self-determination, including the right to secede.
The rights of other nationalities and ethnic groups living in our common fatherland
are fully respected. The principles of sovereign Czech and Slovak republics lead
to the logical requirement to confirm them by adopting constitutions of the





165. See Czechoslovak TV, July 20, 1990, translated and reprinted in Interview with
Premier Marian Calfa, BBC; SWB, EE/0825, July 25, 1990, at B/i [hereinafter Interview with
Calfa]; see Havel, supra note 9. Havel emphasized that he felt a special obligation to ensure
that the interests of the Slovak nation were protected. Id.
166. See Interview with Calfa, supra note 165.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Havel, supra note 9, at 259.
170. See SVOBODNE SLOVO, June 30, 1990, translated and reprinted in Havel on Elections,
Federation, FBIS-EEU-90-131, July 9, 1990, at 46.
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his cognizance of the Slovak people's need to assert a national existence .'
7 1
Havel also articulated his disapproval of the centralist direction of the
interwar centralist Czechoslovak state. For example, he stated that the
concept of "one Czechoslovak people" was "unfortunate" 72 and criticized
continuing Czech paternalism as well.' 73 In addition, the president firmly
stressed that, if a true federation was to be established, the Czech people
must purge themselves of their "arrogant, overbearing, paternalistic, and
avuncular attitude toward the Slovaks.""
The premier of the Czech republic during this time, Peter Pithart,
advanced similar sentiments. He contended that the age of
Czechoslovakism is past and that a greater awareness of the Slovak nation
should be fostered among Czechs. "I Premier Pithart explicitly
acknowledged that the Slovaks have their own identity and are a sovereign
nation. 1
76
In the months following the elections of June 1990, leaders of both
republics and the federal government took decisive steps towards creating
a genuine federation. In July 1990, the Czech and Slovak premiers,
together with President Havel, developed a plan for the future federative
arrangement of the Czechoslovak state.' 77 The plan re-emphasized the
status of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic as two equal entities. 
78
The two republics would only surrender some of their rights in order to
achieve mutual benefits. 179  The plan supported the creation of two
republican constitutions that would be similar in many ways but contain
those differences that suited the particular conditions in each republic." 0
171. Prague Home Service, Sept. 17, 1990, translated and reprinted in Speech by Havel
on Roles of Republics and Federation, BBC; SWB, EE/0973, Sept. 19, 1990, at C11
[hereinafter Speech by Havel].
172. Id.
173. VEREJNOST, May 19, 1990, translated and reprinted in Havel Discusses Czech-Slovak
Relations, FBIS-EEU-90-107, June 4, 1990, at 25 [hereinafter Havel Discusses Czech-Slovak
Relations]. Havel admitted that it is Czech paternalism, rather than Czech patriotism, which
angers the Slovaks. Id. Havel stated that paternalism on the part of the Czechs only causes
the Slovaks to further distrust the Czechs as well as provoking sentiments of radical nationalism
amongst the Slovaks. Speech by Havel, supra note 171, at Cl/2.
174. Havel Discusses Czech-Slovak Relations, supra note 173, at 25.
175. Prague Domestic Service, Apr. 23, 1990, translated and reprinted in Further on
Pithart Statements, FBIS-EEU-90-079, Apr. 24, 1990, at 20.
176. Id.
177. NARODNA OBRODA, July 17, 1990, translated and reprinted in Slovakia's Position in
Federation Reconsidered, FBIS-EEU-90-142, July 24, 1990, at 18.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. One example of such a difference is that within the Czech lands there would be
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One month later, further movement was taken towards bestowing
those powers on the republics that they were promised in 1968.181 In early
August 1990, meetings took place in Trencianske Teplice among the
Czech, Slovak, and federal premiers.' 82 All three premiers once again
agreed that the interests of the Czech and Slovak nations are best served
by a federative arrangement which allows for the sovereignty,
independence, and equal status of both republics."8 3 They reached a joint
conclusion that the federation is the union of two sovereign and equal
republics.' Moreover, they recognized the principle that it is the
republics that have the right to transfer authority to the federation and not
the other way around.1
5
At the August meetings, plans were made for the establishment of
nine expert commissions to evaluate the relations between the federal
government and the republics.186 On the basis of their conclusions, the
commissions would devise draft legislative amendments to the
governments of the republics and their respective legislatures, the Czech
and Slovak National Councils."8 7 The national councils would then present
the draft laws to the Federal Assembly, the legislature of the federal
government.' 88  Thus, legislative power would emanate from the
legislatures of the separate republics."8 9 Another important development
at the meetings was the decision that the constitutions of the republics
territorial divisions in the cases of Moravia and Silesia. There would be no such divisions in
Slovakia. Id.
181. See Speech by Havel, supra note 171, at Cl/1. Havel explained that after 1968, the
federation became only "a different administrative form of the same totalitarian centralism
which had been characteristic for the previous years." Id.
182. Bratislava Domestic Service, Aug. 27, 1990, translated and reprinted in Slovak





186. Id. at 14. The commissions involved concerned the: external economic and trade
relations; communications and all types of transportation; energy policy; metallurgy and fuels;
the labor market and social policy; demonopolization; and the organization and legal regulation
of radio and television. HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, Aug. 14, 1990, translated and reprinted in
Proposals for Republican Governments' Jurisdiction, FBIS-EEU-90-162, Aug. 21, 1990, at 16
[hereinafter Republican Governmentsl.




would be adopted in one year rather than the projected two-year period. 190
The premiers also concluded that the federal constitution would be adopted
after the adoption of the republican constitutions so that its provisions
would be derived from them."9'
Subsequent talks between the three premiers took place on November
13, 1990, at the Hrzan Palace in Prague. 192 During this meeting, the
premiers not only confirmed the agreement reached at Trencianske
Teplice, but expanded upon it. 193  They drafted a constitutional bill
concerning the division of powers between the republics and the
federation. 1"4 This power-sharing bill gave the republics the ability to
create separate budgets and to conclude international treaties. 95 However,
foreign trade, the central bank, taxation, and price reform remained under
the control of the federal government. 96
Despite these advancements, disagreements persisted between Czechs
and Slovaks concerning the amount of power that the republics would
possess in relation to the federal government. 97 At this time, even
President Havel demonstrated the limits of his support of republican
power.' 98 He described the federation as "a voluntary abandoning of a
part of one's sovereignty for the benefit of the sovereignty of a higher
order. "'9 Additionally, he asserted his belief that federal institutions must
190. Id. at 15.
191. Id.
192. Prague Domestic Service, Nov. 14, 1990, translated and reprinted in Pithart Recounts
Talks Between Prime Ministers, FBIS-EEU-90-221, Nov. 15, 1990, at 17.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Leslie Collitt, Agreement Averts Czech-Slovak Split, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1990, §1,
at 2.
196. Id.
197. See Speech by Havel, supra note 171, at Cl/1. In general, Slovaks were eager to
accomplish the transfer of power to the republics as quickly as possible while Czechs were not
as displeased with the situation and so were not impatient to bring about a dramatic
redistribution of power. See id.
198. Id. at CI/2.
199. Id. Havel pronounced that in an authentic federation both republican governments
would delegate certain powers to the Federal Government. Id.
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be respected and "actively created. 2 Havel also argued that "without
a strong Federation there can be no strong republics."2I 1
During this period, there were also those who did not believe that the
federation should exist at all. While one alternative provided for a
confederative arrangement between the Czech and Slovak republics, 2
some Slovak political parties, particularly the Slovak National Party, went
even further and advocated that Slovakia become a totally independent
republic.2"3 One Czech party called for a referendum on the future of the
country." 4 Surveys showed that many Czechs felt that, if the Slovaks
wanted to leave the federation, then "let them. "205
In the weeks immediately following the agreement at the Hrzan
Palace, these differences surfaced in a destructive manner and threatened
to result in a dissolution of the federation. 21 The power-sharing bill was
presented for approval before the Slovak and Czech National Councils.20 7
The Slovak National Council approved the bill without amending it, but
the Czech National Council made several changes. 20  One of the
amendments that most disturbed the Slovaks concerned the provision
dealing with the central bank. 2° Under the compromise reached at the
Hrzan Palace, the central bank was to be governed by a board consisting
of the same number of Czechs and Slovaks, who were to be in office for
200. Id. The president expressed his belief that, while extensive decentralization should
take place, there was a need "to build anew all the organs of our Federation... to seek their
new role, to delimit their contents . . . and respect them in a similar way as citizens of
California or Texas respect the powers of all the Federal institutions of the U.S.A." Id. at
C1/3.
201. Id. at C1/2.
202. Today's Press Survey, CTK National News Wire, Nov. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CTK File.
203. Bratislava Domestic Service, Aug. 14, 1990, translated and reprinted in 10 Slovak
Parties Advocate Independence, FBIS-EEU-90-158, Aug. 15, 1990, at 13.
204. CTK, Aug. 15, 1990, reprinted in Democratic Forum Urges Referendum, FBIS-EEU-
90-159, Aug. 16, 1990, at 12.
205. NARODNA OBRODA, July 26, 1990, translated and reprinted in Meciaron Czech, Slovak
Relations, FBIS-EEU-90-148, Aug. 1, 1990, at 20.
206. Burton Bollag, Havel Asserts Nation Faces Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at
A12.
207. Id.
208. Parliament to Start Debate on Power-Sharing, CTK National News Wire, Dec. 10,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
209. Id.
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one year and alternate for the one-year terms.21° The Czech National
Council dropped this provision from the bill.2"
The most divisive issue concerned the Czechoslovak section of the
international pipelines carrying oil and gas from the Soviet Union to
western and southern Europe. The Czechs wanted the pipeline to
remain under the control of the federal government. 213  The Slovaks
wanted some kind of alternate arrangement through which they would
more directly receive their share of the revenues that flowed from the
pipeline. 2 4 A personal and more heated tone was added to this dispute
when the federal economy minister, Vladimir Dlouhy, publicly criticized
the Slovak premier, Vladimir Meciar, for insisting that the federal govern-
ment relinquish its control over the pipeline.215
Consequently, matters quickly deteriorated to the point at which a
constitutional crisis threatened to tear apart the federation.21 6 In early
December 1990, the Slovak premier threatened that, if the power-sharing
bill was not adopted by the Federal Assembly in the form agreed to at the
14rzan Palace, Slovakia would ignore the authority of the federal
21government. 17 At this juncture, President Havel intervened. During a
televised address to the Federal Assembly on December 10, he asked for
special powers to prevent a breakup of the country. 21 8 He also pleaded for
reconciliation. 19
As a result of President Havel's efforts, two days later, a power-
sharing bill was passed by the Federal Assembly. 2 0 The bill, while not
acceding completely to Slovak demands, contained provisions that were
more acceptable to the Slovaks than the amendments proposed by the




213. Slovak Premier Denies Being Pressed to Resign, BBC; SWB, Dec. 6, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
214. Federal Economy Minister Criticizes Slovak Position on Pipeline Division, BBC; SWB,
Dec. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
215. Id.




220. Tagliabue, supra note 13, at All.
221. Id.
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22bank would rotate between the Czech lands and Slovakia every year.
In addition, a joint-stock corporation would be established to oversee the
oil and gas pipeline. 2 3 Thus, the pipeline would no longer be under the
direct control of the federal government.2
Further tension occurred throughout 1991 as work intensified on the
preparation of the new constitutions. 2z In April 1991, the Slovak
government, under its new premier, Jan Carnogursky, began to promote
the concept of a Slovak constitution in which the equality of the Czech and
Slovak Republics would be based on a treaty concluded between them.226
This proposal initiated a series of talks concerning the nature and content
of the treaty.227
Significant progress was made at meetings that took place in June, in
Kromeriz, among President Havel and representatives of the three
governments and various political parties.228 The participants agreed that
the Czech and Slovak National Councils, as the highest representative
bodies of the two republics, would enter into a treaty concerning the
constitutional configuration of the common state. 2 This treaty would
delineate the extent of the federation's powers. 3 Despite the advances
made at Kromeriz, lingering disagreements sabotaged subsequent talks.
The Czechs insisted that the treaty should merely possess the character of
a legislative initiative.1 They viewed it only as a guideline for the
constitutions.232 However, the Slovaks believed that the treaty should
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Steve Kettle, Czechoslovak Parliament Approves Power-Sharing Law, Reuters, Dec.
12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
225. New Talks on CSFR Setup, Constitutions, Power-Sharing Open, CTK National News
Wire, Oct. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File [hereinafter New Talks].
226. Chairman of Christian Democrats Appointed New Slovak Premier, CTK National News
Wire, Apr. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File. Carnogursky replaced
Vladimir Meciar who was recalled subsequent to his forming a breakaway faction of the Public
Against Violence Movement. Id. The dissension in the movement was caused primarily by
disputes concerning economic reform. Today's Press Survey, CTK National News Wire, Mar.
8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
227. New Talks, supra note 225.
228. Constitutional Talks in Kromeriz, BBC; SWB, June 19, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
229. Id. The treaty would affirm the commitment of the citizens of both republics to live
in a common state. Id.
230. Id.
231. Slovak Premier on Stirin Talks and Work of his Government, BBC; SWB, Oct. 28,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
232. Czechoslovak Parliament Throws Out Referendum on Split, The Reuter Library Report,
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possess the binding force of a legal act 233 and should form the basis for the
new federal and republican constitutions.3 4 The two sides also disagreed
on specifics relating to the division of powers between the federation and
the two republics."
After these differences caused talks between the presidiums of the two
national councils to fail in November 1991, President Havel once again
intervened. In a nationally televised address, he proposed several
constitutional amendments that would allow him, without parliamentary
approval, to call for a referendum on the future of Czechoslovakia.236
In addition, in early December, the president mediated the sensitive
budget talks that took place in Brno between representatives of the two
republics and the federation.237 He arrived at a solution that allowed both
republics to receive a greater allocation of funds from the federal
budget.238 President Havel subsequently stated that the budget agreement
represented a recognition on the part of the republics of their joint
responsibility for the immediate future of the common state. z" He further
asserted that the common state must redistribute its resources according to
the needs of its particular regions." Thus, the budget agreement entailed
a significant redistribution of resources to Slovakia, which has experienced
high levels of unemployment as well as rising prices due to the federal
government's economic reforms. 1 Consequently, the Slovak government
Nov. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File [hereinafter Czechoslovak
Parliament].
233. President Havel Spends Working Day in Bratislava Meets New Slovak Government,
BBC; SWB, May 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
234. Czechoslovak Parliament, supra note 232.
235. Czechoslovak President Calls for Reasoned Reflection, CTK National News Wire,
Nov. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
236. Henry Kamm, As Slovak Separatism Gains, Havel Faces the Unthinkable, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1991, at Al, A16. Havel also proposed the formation of an independent
federal council, which would include members of the two national councils, enabling the
republics to have a greater role in federal decisions. In Prague, Havel Seeks New Powers,
Cm. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1991, at 9.
237. Czech, Slovak Republics to Get Bigger Budget Slices, CTK National News Wire, Dec.
4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
238. Id.
239. Federal and Republican Leaders Reach Agreement on Budget at Brno Meeting, BBC;
SWB, Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
240. Id.
241. Rudolf Prevatil, Czechoslovakia: Czechs and Slovaks Might Stick Together, Inter Press
Service, Dec. 11, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File; Today's Press
Survey, CTK National News Wire, Jan. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK
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wished to limit the powers of the federation, whereas the Czechs
envisioned a more expansive role for that federation.242
Nevertheless, in early 1992, as talks continued between the two
republican governments, most of the contentious issues concerning the
treaty had been resolved." Therefore, in February 1992, a joint
commission of the Czech and Slovak National Councils met in Milvoy and
completed a draft agreement on the future constitutional structure of
Czechoslovakia.' However, the presidium of the Slovak National
Council failed to approve this draft agreement. 4 5 The text of the
agreement was heavily criticized for possessing minimal legal power
because it refers to an agreement between the people of the two
republics. 2' While the term "people" constitutes a political category, it
is not a legal classification.247 Therefore, many Slovak politicians, who
wish to pursue a separate, less harsh economic policy, viewed the treaty
as containing too many concessions. 24
However, even at this point, a great number of Slovaks recognized
that the federation possesses important economic advantages.249 An
independent Slovak republic, and its citizens, would have to bear the costs
of establishing and maintaining a diplomatic corps, banks, and an army
File. At the beginning of 1992, the unemployment rate in Slovakia was 11.8 percent, almost
three times higher than that in the Czech Lands. Czechoslovak Economy Set to Shrink This
Year, The Reuter Library Report, Feb. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT
File.
242. Today's Press Survey, CTK National News Wire, Dec. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CTK File.
243. CSFR President in Slovakia, His Spokesman Gives News Conference, CTK National
News Wire, Jan. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
244. Today's Press Survey, CTK National News Wire, Feb. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CTK File [hereinafter Press Survey].
245. Slovak Political Parties on Draft Czech-SlovakAgreement, CTK National News Wire,
Feb. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
246. Slovak Premier Regrets That Czech-Slovak Agreement Was Voted Out by CDM, BBC;
SWB, Feb. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File [hereinafter Premier
Regrets]. The preamble of the draft agreement states that, "[wie, the people of the Czech
Republic, and we, the people of the Slovak Republic .... " Press Survey, supra note 244.
247. Premier Regrets, supra note 246.
248. Charles T. Powers, Slovak Issue May Imperil Prague's Economic Reforms, Havel's
Future; Czechoslovakia: The Controversy Could Drag on Past the June Elections, with
Slovakian Nationalists Pressing for a Looser Confederation with the Czechs, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1992, at AS. The deputy chairman of the Federal Assembly stated that the Slovak
nationalist politicians were merely using their power to adjust the distorted economic situation.
Id.
249. Mary Hockaday, Forgotten Slovaks Claim a Voice, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 9, 1991, at 12.
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and police, which are estimated to reach approximately $90 million.25 ° In
addition, it would face the loss of its internal markets as well as economic
isolation imposed by other countries. 25 Moreover, a symbiotic
relationship exists between the Czech and Slovak republics.252 Hundreds
of thousands of Slovaks live in the Czech lands and tens of thousands of
Czechs live in Slovakia.253 Laborers move from one republic to another,
and many mixed marriages are also in existence.' 4 This was reflected in
the public opinion polls, which, just several months before the June 1992
elections, showed that the division of Czechoslovakia into two separate
states was only supported by nineteen percent of the Slovak people.255
Despite these considerations, during the period immediately preceding
the elections, the situation became grave. Talks between representatives
of the Czech and Slovak governments were suspended and the Federal
Assembly rejected three sections of the new constitution.2 56 Thus, when
the elections took place, neither a treaty between the two republics nor
new constitutions had been adopted.257
Further, the parties that won pluralities in each republic as a result of
the elections possess ideologies so divergent as to render reaching an
agreement a remote possibility. In the Czech lands, the Civic Democratic
Party, headed by former federal finance minister Vaclav Klaus, an
adherent of rigid free market economic policies, was the victor."
Conversely, in Slovakia, former premier Vladimir Meciar's Movement for
a Democratic Slovakia captured the largest block of votes. 59 Meciar, a
former Communist, is strongly opposed to firther radical economic
250. Today's Press Survey, CTK National News Wire, Oct. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CTK File; VPN Chairman Favors Referendum on Czechoslovakia's Future,
CTK National News Wire, Sept. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
251. Carl Gewirtz, OECD Applauds Czechoslovakia for Fast Move to Market Economy,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IHT File; Slovak Premier
on Gabcikovo Project and Budget Talks, BBC; SWB, Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BBCSWB File.
252. See Slovak Premier, supra note 182, at 19.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Federation Still Most Favored in Slovakia-Poll, CTK National News Wire, Feb. 27,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CTK File.
256. President Expresses Concern About Post-Election Period and Lack of Constitution,
BBC; SWB, Mar. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
257. Id.; Slovak Premier on Problems of Overcoming Past and Guaranteeing Democracy,
BBC; SWB, Mar. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
258. Schmidt, supra note 7.
259. Id.
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reforms, fearing their effect on an already economically weakened
Slovakia. 2" He is also determined to assert Slovakia's sovereignty. 261
Therefore, in the negotiations that took place soon after the elections,
the leaders of the two parties were unable to reach an accommodation. 262
Meciar favored a loose union of two sovereign states in which Slovakia
would have its own central bank as well as the right to borrow in order to
finance state subsidies to industry and the increase of social benefits.263
Klaus, on the other hand, demanded a federation with a strong central
government or, in the alternative, a complete split into two independent
states. 21 Resultantly, the two politicians agreed to pave the way for the
division of Czechoslovakia into two separate nations.265
Several days later, President Havel, in a speech before the Federal
Assembly, implored Czechs and Slovaks to remain one nation, but
conceded that this prospect was now unlikely.266  The president
emphasized that he still believed in the concept of a federal state and
would not preside over the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.267
Consequently, in early July, his attempt to achieve re-election was
thwarted by the Federal Assembly.268 In the first round of balloting,
deputies belonging to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia cast the
decisive votes against Havel.269 Still, it was the Czechs who ultimately
blocked his re-election. 27' Deputies from the Civic Democratic Party
demanded a second vote immediately, despite the rules that provided for
260. Id.
261. Paul Wilson, The End of the Velvet Revolution, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1992, at
57.
262. Split, supra note 4.
263. Velvet Divorce?, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 53.
264. Split, supra note 4.
265. Id. The split is scheduled to occur by January 1, 1993. Blue Velvet, ECONOMIST, Oct.
10, 1992, at 65. Slovakia has subsequently declared its sovereignty. Erazim Kohak, Tattered
Velvet: A Country Falls Apart, 39 DISSENT 441, 444 (1992). The Slovak government has also
renationalized the country's largest printing press. Chandler Rosenberger, Start Czeching, E.
EUR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 10. Further, on September 1, 1992, the Slovak National
Council passed a constitution for an independent Slovak republic. Slovakia's New Constitution,
E. EuR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 9. This document gives a great deal of power to the
government. Id.
266. Stephen Engelberg, Havel Calls for Preservation of United Czechoslovakia, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1992, at A2.
267. Id. Wilson, supra note 261, at 64.




CZECHOSLOVAKIA 'S NEW CONSTITUTION
a delay of two weeks. 271 This maneuver removed the possibility that a
compromise could be reached concerning Havel's candidacy.272 It also
revealed the haste of the Czechs to quickly dismantle the nation.273
Havel failed to win re-election in the second round and, several weeks
later, resigned. 274  Although he could have remained in office in the
capacity of a caretaker, by resigning, he demonstrated his determination
not to preside over the dissolution of his country. 2 Upon leaving the
presidency, he drew attention to the actions of those leaders who had
allowed the Nazis to partition the country in 1938 and the communists to
seize power in 1948.276 In contrast, President Havel stated that "I prefer
to resign before I sign something bad."
271
IV. CONCLUSION
The inability of modern, democratic Czechoslovakia to develop a
viable constitutional system can partly be attributed to the differing
national attitudes and economic circumstances of Czechs and Slovaks.27 8
The Czechs refused to take into consideration the deleterious effects that
the immediate implementation of strict free market policies would have
upon Slovakia.279 In turn, the Slovaks were unable to temper their long-
repressed desire for national recognition.28° These were the main factors
that set the country on the path toward dissolution.281
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia's breakup can also be ascribed to the
emerging trend in Europe. The members of the European Community are
beginning to grow hesitant to surrender part of their national and economic
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supplanted by fourteen independent republics.283 In addition, regions
within those republics are demanding independence.2 ' Most notably, the
republics of Yugoslavia have been unable to find a formula by which they
can peacefully coexist.28 5 Thus, amidst this atmosphere, Czechoslovakia's
attempt to develop a constitutional system that preserved the unity of the
country and provided sufficient latitude for Slovak national growth was
fated to become a victim of an era characterized by uncertainty and
fragmentation.
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